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A Landmark Decision: 
The Stouffer Valley Forge Hotel 
by 
Stanley Turkel 
and 
Russell 0. Stewart 
The information presented in this article is derived from the testimony and exhibits 
offered in connection with the trial of Auger, et a1 v. The Stoufkr Corporation, et al., 
Civil Action No. 93-2529, which took place in the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The authors of this article served as expert 
consultants and expert witnesses to the plaintiff 
This landmark decision involves a cautionary tale of a manage- 
ment company which didn't know enough about the marketplace, did- 
n't commission the necessary research, didn't permit the local man- 
agement to prevail in positioning strategy, didn't provide flexibility on 
rates and pricing, and didn't follow the basic precepts of yield man- 
agement and revenue maximization. The management company tried 
to impose a four-star market position on a three-star hotel by fiat. The 
market wouldn't pay the rates necessary to support the luxury levels 
and amenities that Stouffer provided. Despite all the evidence over a 
five-year period, Stouffer insisted on a four-star operation, resulting in 
the loss of the hotel by the owner to foreclosure by the lender. 
On August 8, 1994, a landmark decision was reached by a jury in 
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, result- 
ing in a verdict as follows: 
for the plaintiff as to their claims against defendants, the 
Stouffer Hotel Company and the Stouffer Corporation, for tortious 
breach of contract, gross negligence, misrepresentation, and breach of 
fiduciary duty. 
for the plaintiff as to their remaining claims against the Stouffer 
Hotel Management Company for tortious breach of contract and rnis- 
representation. 
for the defendant, Stouffer Hotel Management Corporation, as to 
the plaintiffs claim for breach of contract. 
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Story Begins in 1987 
In 1987, the Auger family, through its affiliate, U.S. Penn Hotel 
Associates, purchased the Stouffer Valley Forge Hotel in King of 
Prussia, Pennsylvania, from the Stouffer Hotel Company for $25 mil- 
lion. At the time, the Augers' decision to purchase the hotel seemed 
sensible. It was then the market leader in terms of rates, profitability, 
and stability. 
Stouffer retained responsibility for the management of the hotel 
and received management and other fees during the life of the agree- 
ment. In order to cancel the agreement, which had a 20-year term and 
provided Stouffer with the option to extend, the Augers were required 
to pay Stouffer a termination fee of as much as $8 million. 
In November 1992, afler five years of ownership, the lender fore- 
closed on the hotel because it no longer produced a cash flow sufficient 
to pay the mortgage. During the period they owned the hotel, the 
Augers received virtually no return on their investment despite the 
fact that they committed significant resources to improvements of the 
hotel's physical plant. Indeed, during this 64-month period, the hotel 
went from making a $653,000 profit in 1987 to losing $1.4 million in 
the year the bank foreclosed, 1992. 
In contrast, during this same period Stoder  collected more than 
$3.5 million in management fees, marketing fees, reservation fees, and 
assessments for national advertising. Under Stouffer7s management, 
the hotel lost 61 percent of its individual guests in four market seg- 
ments. This deterioration occurred despite the fact that consumer 
demand in these same market segments grew by 34 percent during 
this same period of time. Moreover, although the Valley Forge hotel 
market experienced some ups and downs, it proved to be relatively sta- 
ble over the long term. Indeed, the occupancy and average rate of the 
hotel's direct competitors was virtually unchanged from 1987 to 1993. 
However, during the same period of time, the Stouffer hotel's overall 
occupancy declined by 21 percent. Thus, whereas the hotel was the 
market leader in 1987, with an occupancy advantage of six points, it 
had fallen to a position at  the bottom of the market with occupancy of 
10 points below the market. 
Market research showed that four of the hotel's direct competitors 
improved their occupancy relative to the market. In contrast, four 
other hotels fared poorly by comparison to the market. Interestingly, 
each of the four hotels that fared well adopted prices that were consis- 
tent with the value they offered to consumers. Conversely, each of the 
four hotels that fared poorly had increased its rates to the point that 
there was a significant disparity between the price charged and the 
value offered. Though it was the market leader in 1987, the S toder  
Hotel performed worse than any of its direct competitors during the 
period it was managed by Stouffer for the Augers' account. 
A variety of factors were tested to determine the cause of this pre- 
cipitous decline in the hotel's performance. This testing was done 
through the use of a variety of well-established marketing techniques, 
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including several in-depth surveys designed to reveal the reasons for 
the defection of the Stouffer's guests. Using Tourist Bureau data, the 
occupancy and rate history of all hotels in the area were analyzed. 
From this data the market was mathematically modeled. The results 
were conclusive: Every hotel that offered rates lower than its perceived 
quality gained in occupancy, while those who charged more than their 
relative quality ranking lost occupancy and market share. 
Guests Left Because of High Rates 
Survey results indicated that the hotel provided high quality ser- 
vice, and that guests found the facilities to be more than satisfactory. 
However, the vast majority of past guests who no longer stayed at  the 
hotel left because of the high rates charged. 
Interviews were conducted with the general manager and other 
senior managers at  the hotel regarding the rationale for Stouffer's 
pricing philosophy, as well as their efforts and experience with rate 
adjustments. Stouffer's on-site management team said that their 
repeated requests to cut rates had been rejected by Stouffer's senior 
management. Stouffer's senior executives also canceled several histor- 
ically successful and critical promotions, thereby making the situation 
even worse. Moreover, the on-site management team also reported 
that Stouffer insisted that the vast majority of the hotel's advertising 
budget, which was paid for by the Augers, be spent on national adver- 
tising campaigns which promoted Stouffer's luxury image, but which 
were not appropriate for the StoufTer Valley Forge Hotel. 
The general manager should have been permitted to manage and 
operate the hotel in accordance with his local analysis and recommen- 
dations, rather than the dictates of Stouffer's senior management. Had 
this occurred, the hotel would have enjoyed the success realized by 
some of its competitors. Moreover, had the hotel been managed and 
operated in a reasonable fashion, the owners would not have lost the 
hotel through foreclosure. 
From 1987 until 1993 the StoufTer Valley Forge Hotel lost 21 percent 
of its annual guests. During this same period of time, the hotel's com- 
petitors enjoyed a 45 percent increase in rooms occupied each year. 
Moreover, the Stouffer Hotel also lost 10 percent of its yearly revenue 
while competitors actually gained 43 percent in average dollar revenues. 
Economy May Have Hurt Hotel 
Stouffer took the position that two factors were responsible for the 
hotel's failure: weak national economy and insufficient market 
demand. Economic factors directly affect the hospitality industry, as 
they do all major industries. However, market research shows that 
Valley Forge is fortunate in that most of its industry is concentrated in 
the pharmaceutical business which did not suffer from the recession to 
the same degree as many other industries. The major demand genera- 
tors in the area are Smith Kline Beecham Corporation, Rhone Plulence 
Rorer, Shared Medical Systems, Inc., Merck and Company, Inc., Main 
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Exhibit 1 
Stouffer Occupancy vs. Competition 
Occupancy % 
75 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Si~ufYer - - - - - - - - 
Competition 
- - - -  
55 
- - - -  
Source: Smith Travel Research 
Stouffer Went From Market Leader to Follower 
Line Health, Inc., Rohm and Haas Company, U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 
and Wyeth Ayerst Laboratories. There is relatively little defense, mili- 
tary, or major banking, all of which were heavily hurt by the recession. 
The demand for hotel rooms for both the Stouffer Hotel and its 
competitors in the area grew in every year except 1991, the year of the 
Gulf War. Furthermore, over the six-year period from 1987 to 1993, 
room demand among the hotel's competitors in Valley Forge grew from 
$32 million to $45 million, or an increase of 43.3 percent. Similarly, 
during the same period, the revenue growth generated by consumers 
of competitive hotel rooms grew on the average at a rate of more than 
10 percent per year. 
A survey of individual corporate travelers to Valley Forge in the 
summer of 1992 revealed that 38 percent of the companies had 
requested a reduction in travel expenses. Moreover, virtually all cor- 
porate meeting planners were under pressure to reduce costs, and 
most companies actually cut attendance at  group functions held dur- 
ing 1991. This made most travelers very sensitive to price and, where 
they could afford higher rates, they tended to choose the best hotel for 
the same price. 
Therefore, from 1987 to 1993 the economic conditions in Valley 
Forge actually were favorable for the hospitality industry. Indeed, the 
market experienced a growth in demand of 43 percent during the peri- 
od in question. Therefore, the financial failure of the S tode r  Hotel 
was not caused by the general weakness of the U.S. economy 
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Market Supply and Demand Was Factor 
During 1987, Marriott opened a Courtyard Hotel and Guest 
Quarters opened a suites-only hotel in the Valley Forge area. The 
opening of these hotels did not directly affect the Stouffer Hotel, which 
was able to increase its occupancy to 72.5 percent (up 1.4 points), and 
to increase its average rate by $3.57 (to $84.51). Indeed, the hotel 
achieved a record profit of $653,000 in 1987. This record-breaking per- 
formance was accomplished by adding over 2,000 occupied room nights 
by individual travelers at  rates of more than $100 per night. 
However, in 1988, with the opening of an additional Courtyard, a 
new Hilton and several limited service hotels (Residence Inn, Days 
Inn, Hampton Inn, and Lodging Unlimited), the Stouffer Hotel began 
to lose occupancy. Though Stouffer added 2,700 group room nights, it 
lost 5,400 non-group room nights, for a net loss of 3.9 percent in occu- 
pancy. In spite of this declining occupancy, the Stouffer Hotel almost 
achieved its 1987 profits by raising its prices (groups up $2.10 and non- 
groups up $3.16) and by cutting some costs. 
The opening of the six hotels during these two years had only a 
modest impact on the Stouffer Hotel because the lower-priced and lim- 
ited service hotels did not compete directly with Stouffer. 
In the 1989-1991 period, Sheraton opened an attractive 160-room 
hotel in the Valley Forge area. Marriott also opened a full service hotel 
in nearby Conshohocken and three additional low-priced hotels, 
Hampton, McIntosh, and Summefield Suites, started operation. 
However, these later hotels, which offered rooms from $39 to 65, did 
not impact the Stouffer, which was offering rooms at over $100 per 
night. 
It is interesting to note that, of the four hotels that performed poor- 
ly, three - the Stouffer, Sheraton Plaza, and the Great Valley Hilton 
- actually raised prices, rather than lowering them during the time 
others were cutting prices. The only hotel to fare poorly and reduce its 
prices was the Hilton in Valley Forge, which still appeared to be over- 
priced aRer the discounts, compared to its quality. 
Based on market research, it was determined that Stouffer priced 
rooms for individuals $32 above Marriott, which had a very strong 
Frequent Guest Program. Naturally, this disparity led many cus- 
tomers to prefer the Marriott. Similarly, the Guest Quarters offered a 
suite of rooms for under $90, as compared to a standard single room 
offered by Stouffer at $125. Thus, it is not surprising that Stouffer lost 
most of its individual guests during the years the hotel was owned by 
the Augers. Stouffer simply would not allow the local management of 
the hotel to lower its prices as necessary, even to retain its long-time 
customers who were happy with the facility. Hence, the Stouffer's loss 
of business was neither a h c t i o n  of the weak economy, nor of 
depressed occupancy in the market. 
Rather, the financial collapse was caused by Stouffer's mismanage- 
ment, as demonstrated primarily by their adamant unwillingness to 
adjust prices when better quality hotels were available at  lower rates. 
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'The Competition Did Better Than Stouffer 
Four of StoufTer's individual segments - rack, corporate individ- 
ual, package, and preferred corporate - declined from 1987 to 1993 by 
61 percent, while the competition actually had more individual seg- 
ment guests in 1993 than in 1987. 
Corporate individuals are adults who are offered a rate better than 
transient guests because they tend to travel frequently, averaging 
about six trips to a particular hotel each year. Normally, corporate 
rates should not vary widely because variable rates tend to alienate 
regular customers. Nevertheless, Stouffer introduced a pricing system 
whereby rates were raised and lowered daily, or even hourly, in an 
effort to optimize revenue. However, as the general manager of the 
StoufTer Hotel properly recognized, "This pricing for corporations con- 
fused and alienated customers." Stouffer's lost about 68 percent of its 
corporate individuals by pricing a single room at more than the com- 
petition was charging for a suite. 
Stouffer raised prices from $115 in 1988 to $127 in 1992, while 
competitors reduced their prices. Stouffer's prices increased by $12 on 
average when suite prices during the same period were reduced by an 
average $15. If StoufTer simply held its prices, rather than raise them, 
and then lowered them to $98 to meet competition in 1992, the hotel 
would have been priced consistently with its quality and could have 
remained competitive. Instead, by adopting a pricing philosophy that 
was contrary to the market, Stouffer embarked on a reckless strategy 
that was destined to sacrifice occupancy and profits in this important 
market segment. 
Accordingly, had Stouffer simply adopted prices that were fair and 
appropriate for the market, the hotel's volume of corporate individuals 
would have acted just like the market: lost volume in 1991 and recov- 
ered in 1992, with gains in 1993. Had Stouffer priced this segment 
properly, it could have expected results consistent with those of the 
market as a whole in each year. In this one segment alone, the revenue 
losses caused by inappropriate overpricing were $2.3 million (the lost 
volume in room nights multiplied by the fair price, less the amount 
which would have been lost by discounting the price paid by the fewer 
number of corporate guests who paid the higher price charge by 
Stouffer). 
Most of Package Sales Were Lost 
Market research revealed that Stouffer also lost about 78 percent 
of its package sales during the same period as it suffered dramatic 
losses in the number of corporate individual guests. In 1988, Stouffer 
canceled the "Family Summers" as well as the AAA Program and 
replaced these successful programs with Breakations, its own unsuc- 
cessful creation. The extraordinary decline in package sales between 
1987 and 1992 was caused by StouKer's overpricing and by its decision 
to cancel historically successful programs. Keeping the A M  program, 
coupled with an average price for this segment of $65 rather than $80, 
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would have allowed the hotel to maintain its previous volume in pack- 
age sales. The resulting loss was over 20,000 room nights and roughly 
$1.6 million in lost revenue. When adjusted to take into account the 
reduced volume of the package sales, Stouffer was able to achieve at 
an unfair price; the net loss in room department revenue for this seg- 
ment alone was $1.5 million. 
Principal competitors of the Stouffer Hotel were two Marriotts, the 
Courtyard and Marriott Conshohocken; two Guest Quarters in 
Plymouth Meeting and Wayne; two Hiltons in Great Valley and Valley 
Forge; one Holiday Inn; and two Sheratons, the Valley Forge Sheraton 
and the Sheraton Plaza. Demand increased for the Stouffer Hotel and 
its competitors every year but 1991, the year of the Gulf War. During 
this same period of time, new hotels were being built, increasing sig- 
nificantly the room supply in the Valley Forge area. 
Hotel occupancy at  Valley Forge was depressed in 1988 and again 
in 1991, but in each case the occupancy recovered once the market had 
time to absorb the new additions to the supply of hotel rooms. 
Therefore, Stouffer's loss of 20 percent of its occupancy during the peri- 
od from 1987-1993 was not caused by any long term depression of occu- 
pancy in Valley Forge. Indeed, there simply was no overall depression 
of occupancy in the area. 
Occupancy Declined for Five Years 
The Stouffer Hotel showed occupancy declines over the 1987-1992 
period, but experienced its worst decline in 1992. During that year, the 
Stouffer Hotel declined by 15.4 occupancy points from 1991. During 
this same period, the occupancy of the hotel's competitors decreased by 
only 2 percent. Three hotels - the Sheraton, the Holiday Inn, and the 
Courtyard - performed about equal to the market. Moreover, four 
hotels actually outperformed the market: the Marriott, the two Guest 
Quarters, and the new Sheraton. All these new hotels used reduced 
prices to gain customers. Moreover, the two Guest Quarters cut prices 
as much as $14 and $16 per night to hold customers and gain new 
ones. Similarly, the Sheraton offered much lower prices and a better 
Frequent Guest Program than the Stouffer Hotel. 
Four hotels fared significantly worse than the market average - 
the two Hiltons, the Sheraton Plaza, and the Stouffer Hotel (whose 
performance was, by far, the very worst in the market). 
Rack rates are the highest posted rates, set at  Stouffer headquar- 
ters, and not by the on-site management team at  the hotel. In 1991, 
Stouffer charged its non-corporate guests prices as high as $159.94, 
higher than any rates surveyed among 35 hotels in the region (except 
luxury hotels in downtown Philadelphia). 
Stouffer lost 86 percent of its rack business from 1987 until 1992. 
Moreover, the general manager again concluded that a reduction in 
price from $140 to $120 would have doubled the hotel's business in this 
very lucrative market segment. Unfortunately, Stouffer refused to per- 
mit this sensible price reduction. The loss due to improper pricing in 
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this segment is calculated to be 10,900 room nights over the five-year 
period from 1987 to 1992. Stouffer's insistence on an artificially high 
price accounted for a net loss of $1.2 million in rack rate room revenue. 
Preferred rates are locally negotiated rates for large companies 
which send many employees to a hotel. Stouffer Valley Forge had 
worked hard over the years to develop this segment because these 
guests tend to be very loyal. In 1987, just after Stouffer sold the hotel 
to the Auger family, they directed the general manager to discontinue 
the preferred rate to many of its best customers. 
The general manager reported "..in 1987 I was told I could only 
offer preferred rates to 12 companies, regardless of lost business. I lost 
10,000 room nights, between this decision and the rate optimization 
program." Obviously, the corporate mandate to eliminate reduced 
rates for all but 12 of the hotel's preferred customers antagonized the 
companies that were discontinued. Prices were increased just when 
new hotels were offering better values. 
Two Groups Are Surveyed 
Two separate surveys were conducted to confirm the reasons for 
the hotel's loss of business. The first group included 20 meeting plan- 
ners who had used the hotel in the past but had either not returned 
or had reduced their usage and the second, 50 individual former 
guests who had not used the hotel in the 12-month period prior to the 
survey. 
The meeting planners were asked to rate the important features of 
the Stouffer Hotel as compared to other hotels in the area. A rating of 
1 would be considered excellent or outstanding, rating of 2, above aver- 
age or superior, and a rating of 3, average. Table 1 shows the scores 
given to the hotel. 
Meeting planners who had not returned to StoufTer rated the hotel 
generally superior to the competition, and the hotel's staff and sales 
groups were rated close to outstanding. As one meeting planner said, 
"The reason I chose the Stouffer was because of the sales group." The 
hotel received an overall rating between superior and outstanding. 
Hence, the primary reason for the discontinued use of the hotel was 
overpricing. 
Meeting planners were asked about Stouffer's group pricing, when 
compared to the competition. They responded with the following opin- 
ions: very high, 19 percent; high, 29 percent; and average, 52 percent. 
Almost half (48 percent) of the meeting planners found Stouffer's 
prices to be higher than average when compared to competition. What 
is most interesting is that all of the meeting planners interviewed who 
continued to use the hotel (albeit less often than they used to) found 
the hotel's prices to be "high." 
Respondents were then asked how important it was to use a 
"Stouffer" when having a meeting. More than three quarters of those 
surveyed (76 percent) found it was "not important," compared to 24 
percent who found it "important." 
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Table 1 
Opinions of Meeting Planners 
Past meeting Current meeting 
planners who planners who had 
had not returned reduced business 
Quality of food 1.8 2.3 
Quality of service 1.8 2.3 
Quality of sleeping rooms 2.0 2.3 
Quality of meeting rooms 1.7 2.4 
Quality of facility (bldg & grounds) 1.7 3.0 
Quality of staff 1.4 1.7 
Quality of sales group 1.3 1.6 
Overall rating of hotel 1.6 2.6 
Meeting planners were next asked to identify the other hotels they 
were using in the Valley Forge area. They listed the following: 
Sheraton, 30 percent; Hilton, 22 percent; Maniott, 22 percent; Guest 
Quarters, 11 percent; and others, 15 percent. All of the hotels identi- 
fied were rated better by the Stouffer on-site management team and 
offered relatively lower prices. 
Higher Prices Rate as Significant Factor 
The survey of the hotel's lost business reports indicated that, dur- 
ing the 12 months preceding this market research, the hotel lost 
approximately 6,000 room nights of potential group business that was 
not due to a lack of available sleeping or meeting rooms. The following 
reasons were given for this lost business: rate too high, 69 percent; pre- 
ferred competition, 23 percent; and other, 8 percent. 
Many of the meeting planners surveyed named the Marriott as 
their alternative hotel. Even more significant is that all of those sur- 
veyed who mentioned the Maniott also said that the lack of a nation- 
ally negotiated contract rate was one of the reasons for their decision 
to use the Stouffer Hotel less or not at  all. Nationally negotiated con- 
tracts typically provide that a hotel chain will offer attractive rates to 
a major company if all of its employees will use the hotel chain should 
rooms be available. 
When asked what it would take to get them to use the Stouffer 
for their future meetings, all but one of the meeting planners sur- 
veyed said "lower price." Other reasons for not using the hotel were 
individual guests charged a t  different prices, no dining variety like 
Hilton's Kobe Steak, poor sales material, no printed menu, hotel not 
up to grade, poor decor, not Grade A, company management insists 
on other hotel, Stouffer will not negotiate national rates, and cannot 
use Stouffer again because we have a nationally negotiated rate. 
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The last comment was the most common single reason given for not 
using the hotel. 
Individual Guests Were Surveyed 
The survey of 50 past guests who had not returned to the hotel was 
designed to determine the reasons for their failure to return, the fac- 
tors that would motivate them to use the Stouffer Hotel whenever they 
were in the Valley Forge area, and perceived quality of the hotel in 
comparison to other hotels in the area. 
Respondents were almost equally split between those who traveled 
frequently to Valley Forge and those who seldom visited the area: fre- 
quently, 43 percent; seldom, 47 percent; and not any more, 10 percent. 
Of those surveyed 56 percent had chosen to use another hotel in the 
future, and did not plan to return to the Stouffer Hotel. Those sur- 
veyed were about evenly divided between the Marriott, the Hilton, and 
the Sheraton, with slightly fewer guests choosing the Guest Quarters 
and the Holiday Inn. 
Other than price, the following reasons were given by those sur- 
veyed for their selection of competitive hotels: Marriott, Honored 
Guest Program; Hilton, friendly attitude and restaurant; Sheraton, 
generally pleased with the hotel and staff; Guest Quarters, liked the 
suites (at Stouffer's single room price); and Holiday Inn, better price 
and nearer the King of Prussia Mall. 
Individuals who stayed at the S toder  Hotel with either a govern- 
ment or group rate were removed from the sample to obtain a better 
reflection of those who paid a normal individually-negotiated rate. Not 
one respondent felt that the Stouffer offered good value with respect to 
rate. The respondents' attitudes toward Stoder's pricing are as fol- 
lows: very expensive, 12 percent; expensive, 53 percent; competitive 
rates, 35 percent; good value, none; and excellent value, none. 
Thus, when the quality of the Stoder  Hotel was compared to the 
other hotels in the area, the majority of those surveyed (65 percent) felt 
that the Stouffer Hotel was overpriced. 
Factors Other Than Price Rank Higher 
Not a single person surveyed found the hotel's location to be "poor," 
and most found the service quality "superior" to other hotels. Room 
comfort and food quality were both about evenly split between "supe- 
rior" and "equal to the competition." See Table 2. 
Survey results showed that 37 percent of individual respondents 
tend to use a StoufTer hotel whenever they can, and 54 percent report 
that they use Stouffer rarely or not at all any more. However, the sur- 
vey results also suggested that, even among those who oRen use a 
StoufTer hotel, there was some reluctance to use the Stouffer Valley 
Forge Hotel. Two guest comments are indicative of this reaction: "Wed 
the Valley Forge Stouffer because of my past experience at  the Battle 
Creek Stouffer, but found the Valley Forge StoufTer too expensive," and 
"I stayed at StoufTer [Valley Forge] expecting it to be like other 
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Table 2 
Guest Opinions of Hotel 
Superior Equal to Competition Poor 
Location 56% 44% 0% 
Service quality 59% 36% 5% 
Room comfort 50% 45% 5% 
Food quality 47% 53% 
StoufTers; but it wasn't. It was not really satisfactory.'' 
These comments reflect the general attitude of guests who are expe- 
rienced with Stouffer hotels and resorts. That is, the Valley Forge prop- 
erty is not of the same quality as many of the Stouffer properties, but it 
demanded high prices that were appropriate for more luxurious hotels. 
For seven out of eight respondents, 'lower prices" or having a "better 
frequent guest program" would be a reason to come back to the Stouffer 
Hotel: lower prices, 55 percent; better frequent guest program, 30 per- 
cent; better facilities (indoor pool, etc.), 10 percent; and other, 5 percent. 
On August 14,1995, Federal Judge Charles R. Weiner vacated the 
jury's decision against the Stouffer Hotel Management Corp. to pay 
$7.85 million to the former owners of the Stouffer Valley Forge Hotel 
near Philadelphia. 
The suit arose out of SHMC's operation of the Valley Forge Hotel, 
pursuant to a management agreement with U.S. Penn. The case was 
tried to a jury in a bifurcated trial. In the initial liability phase, the 
jury found in favor of the plaintiffs on all claims submitted, with the 
notable exception of their breach of contract claim against Stouffer 
Hotel Management Corporation. . 
In the subsequent damages trial, the same jury awarded the plain- 
tiffs compensatory damages of $4.2 million against Stouffer Hotel 
Management Corporation, $2 million against the Stouffer Company, 
and $650,000 against the Stouffer Corporation. In addition, the jury 
warded $1 million in punitive damages against Stouffer Hotel 
Management Corporation. 
In granting the defendant's motion for a new trial, the judge said 
that his decision "turns entirely upon an interpretation of Pennsylvania 
law. ..." ARer careful review, the judge concluded that "the jury's incon- 
sistent verdict kding no breach of contract by the Stouffer Hotel 
Management Corp. But tortious breach" by the Stouffer Hotel Company 
and Stouffer Corporation cannot be left undisturbed. Hence, a new trial. 
Stanley Turkel, a New York based hotel consultant, advises hotel owners, 
investors, and lending institutions on all asp& of hotel acquisition, disposi- 
tion, marketing and operations, and Russell 0. Stewart specializes in hotel 
turnaround situations with client hotels Sheraton, Omni, Choice, and Westin. 
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